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Abstract 
Purpose: Our purpose was to assess failure demand as a lean concept that assists in waste 
analysis during quality improvement activity. We assess whether the concept’s limited use is a 
missed opportunity to help understand improvement priorities, given that a UK Government 
requirement for public service managers to report failure demand has been removed. 
Design/methodology/approach: We look at the literature across the public sector and then 
apply the failure demand concept to the UK’s primary healthcare system. The UK National 
Health Service (NHS) demand data are analysed and the impact on patient care is elicited from 
patient interviews.  
Findings: The study highlighted the concept’s value, showing how primary care systems often 
generate failure demand partly owing to existing demand and capacity management practices. 
This demand is deflected to other systems, such as the accident and emergency department, 
with a considerable detrimental impact on patient experience. 
Research implications: More research is needed to fully understand how best to exploit the 
failure demand concept within wider healthcare as there are many potential barriers to its 
appropriate and successful application.  
Practical implications: We highlight three practical barriers to using failure demand: (i) poor 
general understanding of demand within the healthcare system; (ii) limited understanding of 
systems improvement; and (iii) need to apply the concept for improvement and not just for 
reporting purposes.  
Originality/value: We provide an objective and independent insight into failure demand that 
has not previously been seen in the academic literature, specifically in relation to primary 
healthcare. 
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Introduction 
All public service sector managers are under significant financial pressure, especially after the 
2007 global financial crisis. The UK Government spending on public services and welfare in 
2015 was £747bn, but there have been several financial cuts to public expenditure, with the 
2013 financial review requiring £11bn more savings in the 2015/16 budget (ONS, 2016). The 
challenge for service managers is to identify ways to reduce costs without unnecessarily cutting 
service quantity and quality. Many authors looked towards lean or quality improvement 
approaches to achieve sustainable productivity gains without compromising services. Attempts 
to implement such approaches have been met with considerable difficulties but some 
significant improvements have been achieved in various public-sector organisations (McNulty, 
2003; Lucey et al., 2005; Radnor and Osborne, 2013). 
One approach to implementing lean or systems thinking in the UK public sector is the 
Vanguard Method (Seddon, 2003), which focuses on service purpose, in customer terms, and 
pays attention to service demand type and frequency. Using a systems perspective, the method 
then studies system capability to meet purpose and demand. Like many approaches, there is a 
focus on making work flow through the system and eliminate waste. Vanguard case studies 
about the system have been published (Seddon, 2003, 2008; Middleton, 2010). The OECD, in 
a system review approach to public service improvement, pick out the Vanguard Method as 
one that has led to process innovation and change (Cook and Tonurist, 2012). The Vanguard 
method is a systems approach to services redesign to improve services and efficiency. 
One idea contained within the Vanguard Method is failure demand, defined as ‘demand 
caused by a failure to do something or do something right for the customer’ (Seddon, 2003, 
p26). In a healthcare context, failure demand might appear in many forms, ranging from 
unnecessary prescriptions or repeated diagnostic tests, to repeat patient presentation owing to 
failure to treat a condition at first contact. Other activities, such as unnecessary follow-up visits, 
might also be classed as failure demand. When discussing service improvement, Seddon (2009, 
p.33) makes a bold claim: ‘In service organisations … failure demand often represents the 
greatest lever for performance improvement. In financial services, it can account for anything 
from 20 to 60 per cent of all customer demand … in local authorities and police forces as much 
as 80-90 are avoidable and unnecessary’. It is surprising that failure demand has not received 
more attention, especially its merits and investigation into its use. We seek, therefore, to 
contribute to knowledge in several ways. First, we show how failure demand analyses might 
be conducted and how this could be used to act as a driver for system improvement, based upon 
existing literature. We critique the UK Government’s failed attempt to implement failure 
demand (adapted and termed avoidable demand) as one performance measure that public 
service managers had to submit in their performance reports. Second, we investigate how 
failure demand might be categorised within the UK National Health Service (NHS), focusing 
on how primary care demand is managed and the impact on work in the healthcare. We also 
include qualitative interviews, which examine failure demand’s impact on patients and their 
service experiences.  
 
Healthcare context  
Projected demographic and societal changes are expected to intensify the pressure on health 
systems and demand new and improved healthcare. Ageing populations in both emerging and 
developed nations are increasing healthcare demand. According to the United Nations, the 
world’s population is expected to increase by one billion people by 2025 (United Nations 
Population Fund 2013); 300 million will be people aged 65 or older, as globally, life expectancy 
continues to rise. Healthcare resources and service innovation are needed to support this 
increase. Countries will be affected differently by these demographic changes. Successful and 
sustainable change will require flexible and adaptive models to fit the new health economies. 
Like many other healthcare systems world-wide, the UK’s NHS is under pressure from 
rising deficits, worsening performance and declining staff morale, which means that the NHS, 
a public healthcare system free at the point of use, is facing its biggest challenge for many 
years. The NHS Five Year Forward View (NHS England, 2014) estimates that the NHS needs 
additional £8 billion a year by 2020/21, and this projection depends on delivering £22 billion 
efficiency savings a year by 2020/21; described as ambitious and which requires much higher 
productivity improvements than NHS staff have historically been able to deliver. The UK 
governments have relied on external pressures such as targets, inspection and competition to 
drive reform and improvements (Audit Commission, 1999). This approach has delivered mixed 
results. Examining some high-performing health systems in the UK and internationally, 
suggests that organisation staff, in their pursuit to transform care, should ensure leadership, 
engaging staff and focusing on a clear commitment to put patients first (The King’s Fund, 
2015). In 2016 NHS England staff took steps to relax the key waiting time targets for more 
than 50 English hospitals to help ease their financial problems (NHS England, 2016). The UK 
think tank, the King’s Fund, called for greater emphasis on how services need to change, the 
starting point being new care models proposed in the NHS Five Year Forward View. A recent 
five-year plan review mentions the need for front-door clinical streaming, improving patient 
flow and managing avoidable demand (NHS England, 2017). 
Here we focus on NHS primary care rather than all healthcare services (e.g., acute care). 
Primary care is often the first contact for people needing healthcare, which is provided by 
professionals such as general practitioners (GPs), dentists and pharmacists. The primary care 
system is responsible for 80% of all contact with NHS patients. Sixty-two percent of primary 
care contact is with a local GP and the rest is mainly with practice nurses. Eighty-two percent 
of contact is at practice premises, and an additional 12% by telephone. One issue that the NHS 
must address is what happens when patients require access to primary care services when GP 
facilities are unavailable. ‘Out-of-hours’ (OoH)is usually defined as the period 6.30 pm to 8.00 
am. The responsibility for this service depends on whether GPs opted out of providing OoH 
care, but in many cases the responsibility now lies with Care Commissioning Groups (CCGs), 
where some or all GPs within a region opted out. English CCGs’ original purpose was to give 
GPs a greater input into how services are designed and provided within the community. This 
led, for example, to the growth in alternative treatment provision, such as out-of-hours 
surgeries, walk-in centres and urgent care centres (Roland et al., 2012). 
There have been concerns expressed recently about the primary care system’s ability to 
cope with demand. Dayan et al., (2014) debated the long-term prospects for primary care in 
the UK and highlighted that GPs have experienced a 20% loss in real terms income in recent 
years and there are longer-term recruitment pressures owing to impending retirements and 
recruitment shortages. A recent GP Patient Survey (Ipsos MORI, 2017) reported 32 per cent of 
patients found it difficult to get through on the phone to their surgery, and 16% were unable to 
get an appointment to see or speak to someone the last time they tried. Nearly one in five 
patients (18%) said they tried to contact an NHS service in the past six months when they 
wanted to see a GP, but the surgery was closed, either for themselves or for someone else. 
There is some concern that increasing attendances per patient has put pressure on 
patients a GP is able to care for at any time, resulting in an overload on the requests for 
appointments. In the UK, GPs care for typically between 1,700 and 2,000 patients per full time 
equivalent, but there is variation in these figures (HSCIC, 2016). In the United States, patient 
to GP ratio is referred to as ‘panel size’ and there are debates about the correct proportion, 
partly influenced by demographic factors (Murray et al., 2007). There are other reasons why 
access can be limited, including issues with the way GPs manage patient schedules and the 
difficulties associated with recruiting GPs in the UK. Kiran and O’Brien (2015, p.399), drawing 
on the work of Pope et al., (2008), commented: Many primary care practices in England 
misinterpreted advanced access, often embargoing ‘70% of appointment slots for same-day 
appointments, and then requiring patients to call immediately after the office opened to book 
into these embargoed slots …  this resulted in frustrated patients who complained that the new 
system made it impossible to book appointments with their doctors in advance. This approach 
has poignantly been referred to as ‘access by denial’.’ 
In the winter, 2014, there were considerable issues reported regarding access to UK 
primary care and worse problems associated with long queues and delays in Accident and 
Emergency (A&E) departments, with near gridlocked patient flows across the system (Blunt 
et al., 2015). Patients frequently find there were no available bookable slots for appointments, 
or that waiting times for non-urgent appointments were extending into many weeks’ wait. 
Many GPs keep appointments in reserve as same-day, urgent slots, resulting in long queues 
waiting at surgeries or phoning through early in the morning to gain a same-day appointment. 
Patients who called later in the day were often told to try again the next day as all appointments 
were taken. Similar issues were experienced with accessing emergency services in 2015 and 
again in 2016. Many patients unable to obtain care from their GP will try to seek access to other 
healthcare (NAO, 2015).  
Managing capacity and demand is not well-versed within healthcare. Research focuses 
on secondary care (e.g., hospitals) waiting times and waiting lists management with many 
focusing on how demand and capacity are measured (Silvester et al., 2004). For example, 
Westbury et al., (2009) examine how demand and capacity are measured within a discrete 
surgical speciality, leading to an ability to perform sophisticated analyses and achieve further 
improvements. Walley (2013) reports public services as ‘resource-driven’ rather than ‘demand-
driven’ when planning resources to meet demand. This approach has detrimental effects on the 
way resources are allocated, especially in the medium term. The practical effect is failure to 
understand demand patterns and how to manage them, creating unnecessary queues or wasting 
resources. The general recommendation is, therefore, that pubic service managers should adopt 
private sector capacity planning practices.  
 
Failure demand 
Failure demand emerged from a telephone call study suggesting that most calls received by a 
sales call centre were, in practice, calls from customers complaining about the service they had 
received or reporting issues for the company to deal with, not the desired calls from customers 
wishing to place orders. Marr and Neely (2004, p.4) argue ‘It is critical to understand and 
classify the nature of demand. Often calls are unwanted or even unwittingly generated by other 
parts of the organization. By analyzing and classifying demand, it becomes more manageable 
and more predictable. Unwanted calls could then be reduced or even eliminated.’ Thus, in lean 
thinking terms, these calls indicate waste in the system and handling the call is a waste. A key 
mistake made by managers was to treat all work coming into the system as demand, rather than 
seeing an opportunity to reduce workload on staff and simultaneously improve customer 
service. These analyses have since been applied across the UK public sector, with many reports 
coming from local council services such as (Randle and Kippin, 2014). Housing services are 
the most widely reported applications, with examples provided from several sources (ODPM, 
2005; Jackson, et al., 2007; Masters, 2009; Zokaei et al., 2010). Figure 1 is adapted from data 
provided by Seddon (2003), based on Jackson et al., (2007), breaking down calls coming into 
a council housing department call centre. 
 
Figure 1 here        
 
Figure 1 calls are shown as failure demand (darker) and true demand (lighter); the latter 
includes only new demand that has not been requested previously. So, a first call to request a 
plumber is true demand, whereas a follow-up call to enquire when the plumber is arriving is 
failure demand. This analysis is appealing, as it holistically provides a true insight into system 
waste and what is creating that waste. Anyone familiar with traditional lean thinking tools 
would also see the similarity to conventional Pareto analysis.  
 
Failure demand measurement in government 
In 2008, following a pilot study, local government managers were asked to routinely measure 
and report their failure demand. This announcement had been preceded by prior reports into 
contact between public services and the public (Masters, 2009). For example, one 
underperforming local council had been identified as logging two-thirds of all contact as waste 
demand (Caulkin, 2005). Benefits service errors had also been wasteful, where welfare under- 
and over-payments were resulting in considerable unnecessary contact. The cabinet office 
head, Alexis Cleveland, announced that National Indicator 14 (NI 14) would be Avoidable 
Contact, as the Government’s approach to measurement and recording failure demand. 
Measurement started in October 2008 for first reporting in April 2009. The Government advice 
defined avoidable contact in several ways: 
 
1. Unnecessary clarification sought by the customer; a phone call or email asking to explain 
a poorly-worded communication. 
2. Incorrect contact; the customer is passed to the wrong department or transferred to the 
wrong number. 
3. Repeat contact; the customer must contact the organisation multiple times for the same 
reason; e.g., having to report an address change to several departments. 
4. Customers having to progress-chase work, including enquiries why a home appointment 
had been missed or pre-arranged refuse collection had not occurred. 
5. Repeat contact owing to unfinished work, including closing a job request before the work 
had been completed to the customer’s satisfaction (IDEA, 2008). 
The measure was controversial. As one report stated: ‘The underlying aim of NI14 is laudable 
… However, vociferous debate … has been polarised between those who believe that NI14 
will be an important tool for driving transformation and aligning efficiency … and those who 
believe that NI14 will hinder the process of transformation and divert scarce resources to 
monitoring activities.’ (LGITU, 2008, p.3). Concerns were raised about implementing the 
measure effectively. The LGITU study (ibid) lists potential barriers to its implementation: 
 
• Silo mentality (not sharing knowledge or information). 
• Staff training costs. 
• Weak guidance. 
• Poor support from senior stakeholders. 
• Capacity/skill sets internally. 
• Technology infrastructure. 
• Conflicting policy priorities.  
• Poorly joined up services.  
• Proprietary/incompatible systems. 
• Analysis costs. 
• Data collection costs. 
• No budget to implement changes. 
 
These NI14 concerns were probably justified owing to the measure’s longevity. In March 2010, 
it was discreetly removed from the Government’s measures (Martin, 2010). The main reasons 
publicly given were technical issues about data collection and reporting costs. It was also 
evident that some council staff were reluctant to report the measure accurately and there were 
concerns about the value that councils were getting out of the measurement. 
 
Failure demand in primary care 
In healthcare, the issue is whether patients can receive the right care in the right location 
without unnecessary delay. Failure demand, should it exist, may include healthcare system 
contact that is either unnecessary extra steps in the process to obtain care, or steps in the process 
that do not provide appropriate care. Comparable studies on access issues use two other terms: 
supplier-induced demand (Bickerdyke et al., 2002) and supply-sensitive demand (Dartmouth, 
2007) (Table I). In an integrative study, Rosen (2014) found information that suggests 16% of 
patients attending walk-in clinics would not have bothered to seek any care if this service had 
not been available. Additionally, 46% using walk-in centres should not have needed to attend 
before obtaining the care they needed, which added an extra step in their journey and created 
significant extra health service demand/contact. In some cases, no treatment was needed but in 
others, treatment could have been obtained more directly; e.g., visiting a pharmacy. The 
relative proportions are not recorded. Appleby (2013) showed that substitutes for emergency 
visits to primary care or A&E departments, such as walk-in centres, minor injuries units and 
urgent care centres, made no difference to A&E attendance rates once they were implemented; 
in effect, additional demand. 
 
Table I here  
 
Formal reports mentioning failure demand in healthcare are uncommon, but small studies 
indicate the scope and potential for further study. One report (Locality, 2014) included two 
observations that highlight systemic failure demand generated within the healthcare system: 
‘Studying 21 people with health needs revealed that they created 79 demands on the acute 
healthcare system, 75 demands into GPs, 55 demands on district nurses and 30 demands on 
adult social care. Another study analysed eight peoples’ records going back between one and 
nine years. Collectively, these eight individuals exited and re-entered the system 124 times, 
and were subjected to 236 ‘assess–do–refer’ cycles.’ Locality (2014, pp. 16-17). This work 
appears to support the potential for more healthcare failure demand analysis, with the 
possibility that failure demand is considerable across the healthcare system. In our opinion, 
unmet demand within primary care potentially affects the remaining system; e.g., it is 
suggested that unmet primary care demand can flow to the emergency care system, which, in 
turn, can slow down the emergency care system as it struggles to deal with higher demand 
(Blunt et al., 2015).  
 
Research methods 
We combine two studies. First, in March 2015, an expert panel considered the NHS 2014/15 
‘Winter Crisis’. Ninety healthcare management experts convened for a round table discussion, 
studying each healthcare system element and its role in winter pressures. The expert panel was 
chosen from senior managers, healthcare professionals, technical specialists and improvement 
consultants from across NHS organisations (including Scotland and Wales), civil service, 
universities, independent research organisations and private consultancy companies. 
Organisations such as the Nuffield Trust, the Emergency Care Intensive Support Team and 
Monitor were included in the event. The panel was initially split into groups of ten, with care 
taken to ensure diverse specialities represented at each table. After an introduction where the 
Winter Crisis was described in detail, the remaining time was structured into three sessions, 
where an issue was highlighted, and each table was given the opportunity to discuss and 
recording the issues and reporting their findings in a plenary session. These responses were 
summarised by appointed chairs at each table, recorded in word documents, and handed over 
at the end. Other points by individuals were captured on notice boards, which were 
photographed. Discussants were asked to highlight evidence sources for points raised and this 
resulted in 22 follow-up responses with data after the event. The following questions were 
posed: 
 
1. What drives A&E pressures? 
2. What solutions have worked and failed? 
3. Can we model the system to understand change? 
 
The first session included demand in the system and potential failure demand created by 
changes to system capacity over the winter period. To understand the problems, experts were 
asked to provide data on demand patterns in their system. Follow-up work meta-analysed 
existing data and generated demand flow case material and capacity provision across NHS 
England and Scotland, which was used to look at primary care demand, patient flows and 
impact on service quality. We also consider the impact on other services such as the NHS 111, 
which is the 24-hour telephone service for patients/relatives when there is an urgent healthcare 
need, but not a 999-emergency call requiring an emergency service response. The service is 
provided by trained advisers who are supported by healthcare professionals. During the call, 
patients/relatives are asked questions about their symptoms before redirecting to the best 
medical care provider. Failure demand issues were also elicited from patient interviews, which 
focused on patient experiences when accessing primary care and managing 
interventions/interactions by/with various community services. Fifteen exploratory interviews 
were conducted with respiratory and cardiac patients who were managing the complexities 
associated with long term conditions. The interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. The 
data were analysed using a thematic analysis template (King, 2004). This iterative approach 
develops conceptual themes. Where appropriate, quotations were included within the findings.  
 
Findings 
We found that demand data are not routinely collected, and it is unclear how much unmet 
primary care demand was not met. Individual primary care systems were not in place to capture 
all potential demand during attempts to access the system; e.g., staff in many practices do not 
monitor or record failed calls when requested services were unavailable or appointments 
rejected by callers for reasons such as the delay between call and appointment offered. Staff 
record activity; i.e. work done, rather than demand. Statistics showed how demand is deflected 
to alternative contact points, especially the 111 services, where there are clear, seasonal out-
of-hours contact patterns, which are exaggerated during holiday periods (Figure 2). These 
patterns coincide with reduced primary care system capacity; i.e., the conventional working 
week is reduced by public holidays.  
 
Figure 2, 3 and 4 here      
Data show that between 45-55% of calls result in a recommendation to the patient that they 
attend primary care when non-availability was probably the reason for the call to 111. Primary 
care’s effect on the 111 service is identifiable; over the Christmas period, service staff struggle 
to cope with the increased demand at a time when they have their own staffing challenges, 
which results in more abandoned calls (Figure). What happens to demand that cannot be met 
because the primary care is closed when demand occurs – NHS 111 service staff have no choice 
but to pass demand onto emergency care departments if triage suggests patients need medical 
attention. The NHS A&E statistics show how demand patterns emerge (NHS, 2015). 
 
Impact on patient care 
Interviewees were reluctant to seek assistance from emergency care service staff. If their 
condition and symptoms allowed, all interviewees preferred to seek assistance from their GPs. 
As patients became more skilled at managing their conditions they reported they were more 
likely to seek assistance early when they could access their GP surgeries or other primary care 
providers, such as specialist community nurses. They reported that advice could be via a 
telephone rather than a face-to-face. The interviewees recalled different appointment systems 
operated by their GP practice staff, with some offering open surgeries (where no appointment 
times are given) but patients are seen based on arrival times. Others mentioned the frustrations 
of ringing for appointments during the morning, often being held in a queue before being 
informed that no appointments were available, and to call back later that day or the next 
morning. One interviewee recalled during the early stages of his respiratory condition, that he 
did not seek medical attention until an acerbation had occurred, which led him to attend his 
local emergency department, which led him to hospital admission. He mentioned that his 
condition worsened in the evenings when he was less likely to have access to primary care 
services. Another patient who became unwell after being discharged after heart surgery resulted 
in an attendance to his local emergency department (on the NHS helpline advisor’s guidance). 
The patient was not admitted but medication was prescribed. From regular follow-up 
appointments with his GP, some four days later, it was evident that his visit to the emergency 
department was not registered with his GP practice. Hence, the difficulties associated with 
detecting and recording failure demand across healthcare providers.  
 
Discussion 
One challenge faced by the researchers was to obtain validated primary care demand data at 
practice level. How individual practice staff manage demand means that determining true 
demand on the system is difficult. General practitioners might not understand how much unmet 
demand there is because patient demand is not always recorded. It is not clear from our analysis 
what proportion simply abandon their attempts to obtain medical care when they experience 
problems. Similarly, the way in which GPs attempted to implement advanced access 
inadvertently converts routine demand into emergency demand because routine demand cannot 
reliably be booked in a reasonable timescale. Patients requiring an appointment within one 
week may have to convert this demand into an emergency request. This creates failure demand 
in the emergency care system. Our analysis shows additional demand does not increase hospital 
admissions. Patients unable to access primary care are discharged from the system prior to full 
admission. However, there will be an increase (up to 50%) in A&E minor patient (e.g., less 
severe injuries) workload and an unknown increase in patients triaged as A&E ‘majors’; i.e., 
on arrival at A&E, patients are assessed to ensure that people with the most serious conditions 
and life-threatening emergencies, are seen first (NHS Choices, 2017). 
Patients are generally reluctant to access emergency services when primary care 
services are lacking. Some patients mentioned that, as they became more confident in managing 
their conditions and are less dependent on their GP and other services. They were more able to 
identify exacerbations or early infections and therefore, accessed appropriate services during 
‘normal’ opening times. The expert patient programme in the UK is designed to help improve 
patient outcomes. For example, there are formal (often education-based) patient expert 
programmes, which are designed to help patients to manage their condition (Griffiths et al., 
2007). There were occasions, after seeking advice from national NHS helplines, such as 111, 
where patients were advised to attend their local emergency departments or services. 
Sometimes patients sought advice from specialist community nurses, but these seemed to be 
different across the commissioning landscape, which can be problematic, when patients aren’t 
sure about the care they need, or whether a service is available. 
Data strongly suggest that requests recorded within the UK healthcare system can be 
classed as failure demand and there would be a significant reduction in waste and an 
improvement in patient experience if the failure demand is reduced. We question why the NI 
14 measure was removed, and hence why there is currently no pressure to use failure demand 
within the healthcare system. Our literature search and follow-up analysis identify three 
debates: 
 
1. Should demand measurement be continuous? 
Seddon (2009) recommends that demand and failure demand measurement should be a 
snapshot. The overall picture that the failure demand analysis provides is normally a system 
failure through errors and poor system design. He argues that the underlying NI 14 measure 
issue was continuous measurement and the behavioural consequences (in a ‘command-and-
control’ system), which leads to wrong behaviour. One default command-and-control 
behaviour is to develop systems to manage reporting, not address the underlying problems, 
which become a ‘tick box’ exercise. Seddon’s recommendation contrasts with the ODPM 
(2005) report, which encourages the Vanguard method. The ODPM report puts failure demand 
data into a continuous statistical process control (SPC) chart, which shows the dilemma faced 
by users. Although it is expected that failure demand reduces over time as systems improve – 
and the SPC chart demonstrates this system improvement - there are problems associated with 
continually reporting failure demand. It becomes too tempting to turn the failure demand 
measure into a target, where managers intervene when failure demand temporarily increases. 
This continual measurement also misses the point about failure demand information’s 
diagnostic value. If the focus is on how the measure can be collected and reported efficiently – 
without using the data to help improve the system, then the purpose of the measure has been 
missed. 
We could argue that, although demand for healthcare is relatively stable, there are 
periods when demand changes through epidemics or other special events, or because decision-
making by managers; e.g., changes to ambulance routes and case-mix variation, especially 
monitoring increases in elderly care workload, are also crucial factors that affect the system’s 
ability to cope with demand, which needs to be tracked so that changes are identified. Where 
the mechanisms we have identified are considered, changes in actual demand also affects 
failure demand, and so increases in failure demand may be indicate that a system out of control. 
In UK primary care, failure to understand demands placed on the system must be addressed; 
otherwise appropriate capacity in the system cannot be understood. 
 
2. Is failure demand addressed in the right way?  
We made an analogy between failure demand and Pareto analysis in other lean or total quality 
management settings. We suggest that one reasons for limited success in the public sector is 
the linkage between analysis and system behaviour. When a conventional approach to process 
improvement is matched with a failure demand analysis, there may often be a gap in the root 
cause analysis; i.e., why the failure demand occurs. In conventional Pareto analysis, diagnosis 
would be accompanied by system assessment such as a ‘5 whys’ assessment. Managers without 
the appropriate systems training tackle the symptoms, not address the system issues (Trbovich, 
2014). Failure demand must be linked to full systems analysis (including appropriate systems 
mapping). 
 
3. Is failure demand measurement used for the right purpose? 
Seddon (2009) said that using failure demand to set targets misses its purpose. Our experiences 
suggest that the using failure demand as a performance measure is clearly inappropriate and is 
strictly a diagnostic and indicative tool.  
 
Conclusions 
We open the failure demand dialogue in relation to accessing healthcare emergency services. 
We draw upon UK national demand data and patient experience interviews to convey how 
failure demand might present in healthcare. Our overall aim was to assess failure demand as a 
lean concept to analyse waste during quality improvement activity. Our contribution is three-
fold: first, providing insight in to how failure demand analysis may be conducted, Second, 
showing how failure demand can affect the healthcare system. Third, indicating how failure 
demand affects patients. We confirm that limiting failure demand analysis is a missed 
opportunity to help understand healthcare improvement priorities. We recognise the difficulties 
associated with recording failure demand activity particularly across healthcare providers. We 
focused mainly on NHS primary care. Further research is required, therefore, to explore failure 
demand in other healthcare settings, such as hospital departments. Our research has 
implications for academics, practitioners and policy makers. For academics, it is a call to 
generate further empirical studies to broaden our failure demand understanding, particularly 
within healthcare. For practitioners, there is a need to identify failure demand when looking to 
redesign and improve services. For policy makers, there is a need to support managers trying 
to measure and reducing failure demand within their services. 
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 Table I: Demand types in healthcare 
 
Demand type Description 
Supplier-induced demand Demand created by providers as imperfect care agents  
Supply Sensitive demand Increased health service use stimulated by increased 
(regional) supply 
Induced demand Attendance at walk-in centres or 111 services where the 
patient would not have used a service if it was unavailable 
Induced utilisation Service use following an initial contact with a direct access 
service, which would have occurred even if the direct access 
service was not available and are therefore additional 
attendances 
 
 
Figure 1: Failure demand analysis (Adapted from Seddon, 2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Calls to the 111 Service, 3 Nov. 2014 to 1 Feb. 2015 (Adapted from NHS England, 
2015)  
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Figure 3: Abandoned calls at the 111 Service, 3 Nov. 2014 to 1 Feb. 2015 (Adapted from NHS 
England, 2015) 
 
 
 
Figure 4: 111 patient referrals to A&E (daily) (Adapted from NHS England, 2015) 
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